The Myanmar military forces launched a genocidal campaign against the civilian Rohingya in Rakhine State in 2017. Within two months, more than 750,000 Rohingya people fled to neighbouring Bangladesh[1]. The campaign known as Operation Clearance destroyed villages, killed and wounded civilians and subjected women and girls to sexual violence. Yet formal legal and political recognition remains unresolved. This gap matters because the language used to name mass violence can shape international attention, accountability and the possibilities available to survivors. Our research examines not only the legal definition of genocide, but also the denial and diplomacy surrounding its recognition.
The Gambia, a small African country, filed a case against Myanmar with the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in 2019 under the provisions of the 1948 Genocide Convention. This was the first time a country, without being a direct party, litigated another country for committing genocide on behalf of a persecuted community[2]. It revealed that international law could be used to challenge impunity, even as some powerful states were hesitant to act. The proceedings also show how legal mechanisms can sustain international scrutiny, even when the process is slow and politically contested. Provisional measures were ordered for action and preliminary objections dismissed, but a final judgment is still a long way off. Even if the ICJ eventually rules that Myanmar committed genocide, enforcing that decision against a resistant state will be very difficult. Meanwhile, the Rohingya still remain stateless in refugee camps in Cox’s Bazar and on Bhasan Char Island in Bangladesh and in uncertain conditions across South and Southeast Asian states, including Malaysia, Thailand, India, Nepal and Indonesia. Their lives remain caught in legal, political and humanitarian uncertainty. Sustained legal action, diplomacy and survivor-led advocacy can help keep their rights and priorities on the international agenda.
Recognition or non-recognition is not determined by evidence alone or by victims themselves. Nor is it decided merely by the legal definitions enshrined in the 1948 Genocide Convention and the 1998 Rome Statute. These decisions are instead shaped by the economic, diplomatic and geopolitical interests of states involved and international organisations. For example, China and Russia have shielded Myanmar at the UN Security Council[3], ASEAN maintains a policy of non-interference[4], and many countries have economic, diplomatic, or geopolitical reasons to avoid challenging Myanmar. These factors can slow or weaken efforts towards official recognition. Understanding them can also help identify where coalition-building, sustained diplomacy and international pressure may be most effective. In this way, the recognition of genocide turns out to be as much a diplomatic and political act as a legal one, influenced by who gains or loses from naming an atrocity.
Placing the Rohingya case within this wider context, our research asks why some genocides are quickly recognised, while others, like the Rohingya genocide, continue to be unresolved for years. Perspectives from genocide studies, international law, political science, anthropology, sociology, gender studies and journalism help address this question. This interdisciplinary approach analyses the impact of geopolitical alliances, the role of media framing, the function of international courts as both facilitators and barriers to justice, and how states construct narratives of denial. Through this comparative lens, we seek to build a theoretical framework for understanding genocide denial not as an aberration, but as a structural failure of the international system. Denial persists whenever legal recognition challenges established strategic, economic and diplomatic arrangements.
Our research also pays close attention to the consequences of non-recognition for those who experienced genocide and lived through it. Denial is not just a legal or diplomatic issue, but directly affects survivors’ mental health, dignity, and everyday social life across generations[5]. Without formal recognition, it is harder for survivors to get reparations, obtain citizenship, and ensure durable resettlement. It also shapes how they tell their stories, how children born in exile see their identity, and how communities remember and seek justice without official support. Survivors’ testimony, personal accounts and collective memories help ensure that the human costs of diplomatic inaction are not overlooked.
Our edited collection, Politics of Denial and Non-Recognition of Genocide: The Case of the Rohingya, argues that to understand the Rohingya genocide, we must also understand the politics around its recognition and the diplomacy of denial. Contributors from different fields explore how law, politics, history and lived experience intersect. Together, these perspectives can build a fuller picture of how genocide is recognised, challenged, or ignored locally and internationally, and what this means for people seeking dignity, justice, citizenship and safe, voluntary repatriation.
Progress will require legal action and diplomatic persistence to work together. International proceedings can establish a public record and clarify state responsibilities; sustained advocacy can keep attention on the rights and priorities of Rohingya communities; and regional and international partnerships can create openings for citizenship, protection and accountability. The larger lesson is that recognition is not only a label applied after violence. It is a continuing process through which institutions and communities can build pathways towards justice, dignity and belonging.
Nasir Uddin is a Cultural Anthropologist and Professor of Anthropology at the University of Chittagong, Bangladesh.
Palash Kamruzzaman is Professor of Social Policy at the University of South Wales, UK.
Bayes Ahmed is an Associate Professor in the Department of Risk and Disaster Reduction, University College London, UK.
References
[1] Uddin, N. (2020). The Rohingya: An Ethnography of Subhuman Life. (Delhi: Oxford University Press)
[2] Venkatachalam, A. (2025). “Gambia v. Myanmar: Analysing ICJ’s Ground-Breaking Genocide Verdict.” Myanmar: Analysing ICJ’s Ground-Breaking Genocide Verdict (August 11, 2025).
[3] Lu, X., & Zhang, Y. (2026). “What Post-liberal Peace Looks Like: China, Russia and Fragmented Conflict Management in Myanmar.” Globalizations, 1-17.
[4] Haryono, E., Sumrahadi, A., & Narayani, A. A. I. R. M. (2024). “The Principle of Non-Interference Curtails ASEAN Action in Addressing Human Rights Violations in Myanmar.” Journal of International Studies (JIS), 20(1), 233-261.
[5] Belal, D., Konak, S., Uddin, N., & Kamruzzaman, P. (2026). “Claims of the Rohingya Genocide: View from Genocide Victims.” In Uddin, N., Kamruzzaman, P., & Ahmed, B. (Eds.). Politics of Denial and Non-Recognition of Genocide: The Case of the Rohingya (Palgrave Macmillan, 2026)