This is the framework proposed by Namahoro Jean Pierre, Wu Qiaosheng, Deyun Wang, and Zhou Na, of the School of Economic and Management, China University of Geosciences (Wuhan), in a paper recently published on Nature - Communication Earth & Environment.

https://rdcu.be/ekZAq

This research was driven by a critical observation: many countries endowed with abundant reserves of critical materials, such as nickel, manganese, cobalt, platinum, and bauxite, essential for energy storage technologies, are themselves deficient in clean energy infrastructure. Despite this, these countries continue to attract substantial foreign direct investment for the extraction of their critical materials. Due to economic vulnerability, these countries often prioritize short-term revenue generation from mineral exports over long-term investments in clean energy development.

Our analysis revealed that much of the foreign direct investment in critical material extraction originates from developed and developing countries that are global leaders in clean energy production and deployment. These dynamic underscores a growing disparity between material-producing countries and clean energy producers.

Our research included a comprehensive mapping of foreign direct investment-driven extraction projects between 2016 and 2021, tracking critical materials from their source mines to their international destinations. Key findings revealed that foreign entities controlled the following proportions of output from major mines: 55.56% of bauxite, 52.47% of manganese, 59.28% of cobalt, 59.3% of nickel, and 56.59% of platinum. These operations are predominantly located in low- and lower-middle-income countries, while control and benefit accrue mainly to upper-middle- and high-income countries.

To quantify the disparity, we developed the Clean Energy Vulnerability Index, a metric designed to assess the susceptibility of critical-material-rich countries to clean energy risks. Using this index, we proposed a strategic redirection of foreign direct investment-related mining projects toward domestic clean energy development in producer countries.

Modeling a redirection of just 40% of foreign direct investment-controlled mineral production toward clean energy deployment demonstrated substantial benefits. In countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo, Indonesia, South Africa, and Guinea, such reallocation could drastically reduce clean energy vulnerability. For example, in the DR Congo, redirecting 40% of cobalt production under foreign direct investment control could increase clean energy capacity from a mere 0.108 GW to an estimated 1,922.4 GW. These findings underscore the urgency and potential of reshaping investment strategies to foster more equitable and sustainable energy futures. We urge policymakers and global leaders to consider this framework as a path toward shared prosperity and climate resilience.