Fighting invasions: turning fragmented efforts into collective wins

When invasive species spread, local managers often respond in isolation. Our study shows that in connected landscapes, this leads to failure. Coordinated strategies, instead, reduce both costs and invasion. The results support new approaches to managing ecological threats.

Published in Economics

 Fighting invasions: turning fragmented efforts into collective wins
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Cooperation against invasions: multi-agent control of alien species in connected landscapes - Annals of Operations Research

Invasive alien species (IAS) increasingly threaten biodiversity, ecosystem services, and economic sustainability, particularly in fragmented landscapes where management responsibilities are decentralized. The spread of IAS is not confined within administrative borders but it follows ecological connectivity, making isolated local interventions often ineffective. This work presents a dynamic game-theoretic framework for modeling the strategic management of IAS across a network of heterogeneous areas linked by spatial diffusion. Each agent, responsible for local control of the invasion, faces a trade-off between reducing ecological damages and sustaining the economic costs of intervention. The analysis explores how the interaction between spatial structure, ecological features, and decentralized decision-making shapes outcomes under non-cooperative, coalition-based, and fully cooperative strategies. To support the cooperative behavior, fair cost-allocation mechanisms are proposed based on Nash bargaining and the Myerson value, explicitly accounting for spatial externalities. Numerical experiments on a synthetic three-node network illustrate how cooperation can substantially reduce invasion spread and management costs, while strategic defection may exacerbate both ecological and economic losses. The main findings of the analysis underline the vulnerabilities of fragmented management and the need for institutional arrangements to promote adaptive, equitable, and spatially informed strategies for IAS control.

Ecosystems do not follow administrative borders. Invasive alien species such as the blue crab (Callinectes sapidus) or the tree of heaven (Ailanthus altissima) move freely across rivers, coastlines, ecological corridors and transport networks. Local control efforts, even when well-intentioned, often fail to stop them.

In our latest study, we developed a dynamic multi-agent model to address this challenge. We imagined a fragmented landscape made up of multiple regions, each under the control of a different decision-maker. Each agent decides how much effort to devote to controlling the invasive species, but their actions have consequences beyond their own boundaries. Managing the invasion becomes a shared strategy game, where each move shapes the outcome for all.

๐Ÿ” When everyone acts alone:
The result is higher costs, limited effectiveness and repeated reinvasions.

๐Ÿค When regions coordinate:
Invasion slows down and collective costs decrease. To support cooperation, we propose two cost-sharing solutions. The Nash Bargaining solution fairly divides the benefits of coordination. The Myerson index assigns costs based on each agentโ€™s position in the ecological network.

๐Ÿ“Š Our simulations confirm that cooperation brings clear benefits, especially when landscapes are highly connected and when control costs differ across regions.

The policy relevance of our model lies in its ability to inform real-world decisions. It offers a framework to support regional and cross-border strategies by identifying when cooperation is beneficial, how it can be organized effectively, and how to share costs in a way that is fair and transparent.

Mathematical models can help design decisions that are more effective, more equitable and better aligned with ecological realities.

Read the full paper in Annals of Operations Research

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Resource and Environmental Economics
Humanities and Social Sciences > Economics > Resource and Environmental Economics