Efficiency versus security in the transportation security agency (TSA’s) public-private partnership program (PPP)

Do public-private partnerships (PPPs) create more efficiency in a public organization? This review examines this issue with respect to Transaction Cost Theory (TCT) and privatization when the Transportation Security Agency started the Screening Partnership Program (SPP).
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By March 13, 2026, Transportation Security Administration (TSA) employees had missed their first full paycheck, which led some employees to call out from work or resign. On March 27, 2026, President Trump issued a presidential memorandum directing the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to use available funds to pay TSA agents despite the ongoing shutdown. On March 30, 2026, most TSA employees received retroactive pay under the memorandum issued by President Trump and implemented by DHS. Major backlogs were reported at airports such as Hartsfield-Jackson Atlanta International Airport and George Bush Intercontinental Airport. These delays lasted as long as three hours (Associated Press, 2026). The March 2026 TSA shutdown exposed a vulnerability in a highly centralized approach to airport security: when the federal screening workforce is disrupted, airport operations can be disrupted with it.

Airports participating in the Screening Partnership Program (SPP) were potentially less exposed to TSA staffing shortages because passenger screening was conducted by private contractors rather than federal TSA employees. The SPP is a public-private partnership under which private contractors perform passenger screening under TSA oversight. Although the program existed before 2012, some policymakers advocated expanding public-private partnerships for airport screening. The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 subsequently lowered barriers to SPP participation by establishing clearer approval standards and limiting TSA's discretion to reject applications.

Turtz (2024) examined the expansion of the SPP through the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Modernization and Reform Act of 2012. Following September 11, 2001, the creation of the TSA through the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) of 2001 shifted airport security policy from preventing Type I errors, such as travel delays, toward preventing catastrophic Type II errors. The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 subsequently renewed attention to Type I errors by streamlining the SPP to improve efficiency. Using Kingdon's (1984) Multiple Streams Framework, the analysis examined why airport security policy shifted back toward balancing security with travel efficiency. Both the ATSA and the FAA Modernization and Reform Act had strong problem streams; however, the ATSA had a stronger political and policy stream because of the immediate need to address the aftermath of September 11.

Since then, 10 additional airports have joined the SPP, doubling the program to a total of 20 airports as of 2026. Turtz and Ramos (2026) examined the arguments both for and against the privatization of security screeners. The study found that potential advantages of privatized screening include increased efficiency, higher revenue, and lower operating costs, whereas disadvantages include planning and implementation risks as well as problems associated with asymmetric information. The study concluded by asking whether the TSA should continue expanding the SPP or instead return to a fully federalized screening system. Supporters of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act and an increase in private security screeners criticized excessive government involvement; however, as Kettl (2015) argued, these “complaints about ‘too much government’ regularly alternate with worries about ‘where was government’ during crises.”

In May 2026, TSA introduced TSA Gold+ as an expansion of the SPP model. Unlike the traditional SPP, in which TSA provides the screening technology and contractors provide personnel, Gold+ allows participating airports and private screening partners to assume greater responsibility for managing and investing in screening personnel and technology while adhering to TSA standards. This expands contractor responsibilities to include management of screening personnel, screening technology, and checkpoint operations and maintenance. TSA, however, retains responsibility for regulatory oversight, audits, inspections, and establishing security standards. Tampa International, Des Moines International, and Charleston International airports were identified as the first three airports participating in the Gold+ rollout. However, on August 24, 2026, Tampa International Airport elected not to proceed with TSA Gold+ and will continue to have passenger screening performed by federal TSA officers.

The experience of the shutdown therefore raises a broader question about how airport security should be organized. The SPP provides evidence that alternative security-screening arrangements can potentially reduce airports' exposure to federal TSA workforce disruptions. Gold+ represents a further expansion of this governance model by giving participating airports and private screening partners greater responsibility for both the screening workforce and security technology while retaining federal oversight of security standards and compliance. This shift raises an important public administration question: whether greater administrative decentralization can improve operational resilience without weakening federal accountability for aviation security.

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Emerging Risks to Transportation Networks from Robotic Autonomous Systems, Artificial Intelligence, and Cyber-Kinetic Attacks

The Journal of Transportation Security invites original manuscripts for a special issue on the emerging risks that artificial intelligence (AI), robotic autonomous systems, and cyber-kinetic attacks pose to transportation systems.

Transportation networks are increasingly connected, autonomous, software-defined, and data-driven. AI and robotics promise major gains in safety, efficiency, and resilience across aviation, maritime, rail, highway, pipeline, logistics, and intermodal transportation—but they also introduce vulnerabilities that nation-states, terrorists, criminal enterprises, and other malicious actors may exploit.

Cyberattacks are no longer limited to data theft or digital disruption. By manipulating autonomous vehicles, navigation, communications, sensors, industrial control systems, or decision-support tools, AI-enabled cyber-kinetic attacks can produce real-world physical consequences: disrupted services, damaged infrastructure, endangered passengers and operators, interrupted supply chains, and cascading failures across interconnected networks. As digital attacks increasingly produce kinetic effects, the traditional boundary between cybersecurity and physical security is dissolving.

This special issue seeks high-quality interdisciplinary research that advances understanding of these threats and identifies practical strategies for prevention, detection, mitigation, resilience, and recovery.

Topics of Interest

Topics include, but are not limited to:

Threats and attack vectors

  • AI-enabled cyber-kinetic attacks on transportation infrastructure, including ports, airports, rail networks, highways, and logistics hubs
  • Malicious use of robotic autonomous systems and unmanned vehicles (aerial, ground, surface, and underwater)
  • Adversarial machine learning and attacks against AI-enabled transportation systems
  • Sensor spoofing, navigation manipulation, GPS/GNSS denial, and perception attacks

Security and defense

  • Security of autonomous road, rail, maritime, aviation, and logistics systems
  • Transportation operational technology (OT) security
  • Secure-by-design autonomous transportation architectures
  • Detection, response, attribution, and recovery from cyber-kinetic attacks
  • Supply chain security for AI-enabled transportation technologies

Resilience and risk

  • Transportation network resilience and continuity of operations
  • Cascading failures across interconnected transportation systems
  • Risk assessment and modeling of cyber-physical transportation threats
  • Digital twins, simulation, red teaming, and transportation wargaming
  • Human-autonomy teaming and operator decision-making under attack

Policy and practice

  • Policy, governance, regulation, and legal implications
  • Public-private partnerships and critical infrastructure protection
  • Case studies of transportation security incidents involving AI or autonomous systems

Types of Contributions

The editors welcome:

  • Original research articles
  • Review papers
  • Conceptual and theoretical studies
  • Technical and engineering research
  • Risk analysis and modeling
  • Simulation and experimentation
  • Case studies
  • Policy and governance analyses
  • Practitioner perspectives

Interdisciplinary submissions bridging transportation security, cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, robotics, engineering, operations research, supply chain management, emergency management, public policy, and defense studies are particularly encouraged.

Submission Information

Authors should prepare manuscripts in accordance with the Journal of Transportation Security author guidelines and submit them through the journal’s online submission system.

Please select the Special Issue:

Emerging Risks to Transportation Networks from Robotic Autonomous Systems, Artificial Intelligence, and Cyber-Kinetic Attacks.

All submissions will undergo the journal’s standard double-blind peer-review process.

Important Dates

  • Call for Papers Released: August 15th 2026
  • Manuscript Submission Deadline: October 15th 2026
  • Initial Decisions: December 1st 2026
  • Revised Manuscripts Due: January 1st 2027
  • Final Decisions: February 15th 2027
  • Expected Publication: April 1st 2027

The editors look forward to receiving innovative contributions that advance the understanding of one of the fastest-evolving challenges facing transportation security worldwide.

Publishing Model: Hybrid

Deadline: Oct 15, 2026