Hantavirus infection outbreak in a cruise ship: Management errors and public health issues
Forty years ago, in 1986, the same year as the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, the first case of what would have become popularly known as "mad cow disease", officially defined as "bovine spongiform encephalopathy" (BSE), was identified (Wells et al., 1987).
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With the primary aim of managing the many gaps in knowledge and, together with them, the potential risk of transmission to humans associated with this new nosological entity—the only prion disease with proven zoonotic capability (Almond & Pattison, 1997)—the "precautionary principle" came into play, an "ad hoc" expression coined for the first time on that occasion (Agrimi et al., 1992). This principle is based on risk analysis, which is in turn subdivided into the various components comprising it, namely "hazard identification", "risk quantification", "risk management", and "risk communication". The first two fall within the domain of the Scientific Community, whereas risk management and communication involve both the scientific and the political-governmental levels.
In short, the less is known about a given health issue and the effects resulting from human (and animal) exposure to the responsible agent, the greater the need to rely on the precautionary principle.
Applying these basic concepts and making an "ad hoc" assessment regarding the recent Hantavirus infection/disease outbreak that occurred aboard the Dutch cruise ship “MV Hondius,” I personally believe—as a veterinary pathologist and former university professor who devoted 40 years of his life to the study of infectious diseases—it was a serious mistake to allow passengers from as many as 23 Countries to disembark before their real health conditions had been ascertained. By “health conditions” I obviously mean those verified through appropriate laboratory investigations, first and foremost sero-epidemiological analyses, considering that since at least thirty years "ad hoc" tests (immunofluorescence, ELISA, etc.) are available to demonstrate the presence of specific anti-Hantavirus antibodies (Weissenbacher et al., 1996). Since all the cruise passengers were already on the ship—which, in such an unprecedented situation, could rightly have been considered a sort of “quarantine facility”—why was the decision made to let them disembark before the aforementioned serological tests aimed at establishing viral exposure and the degree of infection spread among the passengers were carried out? A bizzarre and incomprehensible decision in open contradiction with the precautionary principle!
The first confirmed case of person-to-person Hantavirus transmission dates back to 1996, in Argentina, where a South American endemic rodent, the long-tailed pygmy rice rat (Oligoryzomys longicaudatus), was also implicated—as it still is today—in the primary transmission of the infection to humans, in a manner almost analogous to that observed for all other members of the genus Orthohantavirus, transmitted to humans through the inhalation of aerosols containing faecal, urinary and/or salivary materials from infected mice, rats and voles (Leuenroth, 2006). More in detail, reference is being made to the viral strain called “Andes” (ANDV), the only one considered capable of human-to-human transmission—albeit with limited efficiency, far lower than that of SARS-CoV-2, the betacoronavirus responsible for the COVID-19 pandemic—and itself responsible for a severe respiratory disease (“Hantavirus Cardio-Pulmonary Syndrome,” HCPS). The three cruise passengers who died aboard the “MV Hondius,” like all those who fell ill, had contracted an ANDV infection, which in 2018–2019 had already been responsible, once again in Argentina, for a cluster of 34 cases, 11 of which were fatal (Martínez et al., 2020).
Particularly noteworthy in this regard is the role played by three “super-spreaders” of the virus who, during a birthday party, most likely transmitted the infection to numerous individuals. Although the three aforementioned “big spreaders” were all symptomatic, the authors of this study report that the severity of clinical manifestations and the length of time patients spent in hospital did not carry the same relevance, in terms of probability of transmitting the infection to others, as did the especially high viral titers in aerosols and droplets released by infected individuals, together with close and prolonged contacts between people (Martínez et al., 2020).
Let us imagine for just a moment how such a situation could occur, all the more so, on a cruise ship where close, prolonged and repeated contacts would have taken place not merely for the duration of a birthday party, but actually for weeks, considering that the “MV Hondius” reportedly set sail from the Argentine coast at the beginning of April!
Keeping firmly in mind, once again, the precautionary principle, attention should be also drawn to ANDV Hantavirus endoteliotropism, which would plausibly allow the pathogen to spread to numerous host tissue districts, with subsequent shedding into the external environment through various biological fluids such as urine and saliva (Velavan et al., 2026). By leaving the human body through the aforementioned biological matrices, as well as through aerosols and/or saliva droplets emitted by infected individuals carrying high viral loads—i.e. super-spreaders—, combined with the long incubation period characteristic of ANDV infection (up to 6 weeks and beyond), the virus could also contaminate several surfaces and/or materials. Following repeated contact with and/or prolonged exposure to contaminated surfaces or materials
further cases of secondary infection could occur, although the environmental resistance of ANDV does not appear to be particularly high. Different degrees of genetic susceptibility to viral infection among individuals could also play a role, with particular reference to patients of European ethnicity and certain molecular configurations/properties of integrin αVβ3 (Velavan et al., 2026).
To what extent all the aforementioned factors and variables have thus far been taken into account in assessing the risk of human-to-human transmission associated with the ANDV outbreak in the cruise ship "MV Hondius"?
Very little, I'm afraid.
Still noteworthy, alongside the big differences of ANDV and SARS-CoV-2 in terms of transmissibility and lethality rates, emphasis should be also placed upon the scientific knowledge gained on both viruses. Indeed, while it is true we have known SARS-CoV-2 only since December 2019, whereas we have known ANDV for at least 30 years, there is a tremendous gap
between the enormous body of papers published on the betacoronavirus responsible for the COVID-19 pandemic and the far smaller amount available on the ANDV Hantavirus. Consequently, very much remains to be learned about the latter, so that the unprecedented disease outbreak recently recorded aboard the Dutch cruise ship “MV Hondius” may undoubtedly contribute significantly, if properly studied, to filling the many current gaps in knowledge, with special reference to the role of asymptomatic and paucisymptomatic individuals in spreading the infection.
It would also appear beneficial, if not necessary, recalling the valuable and precious lessons taught by the COVID-19 pandemic, in order to avoid repeating the serious mistakes of the recent past, foremost among them the “hospital-centered” management of an infectious disease caused by a zoonotic pathogen.
In this respect, it should be additionally emphasized that at least 70% of "emerging infectious diseases" have their origin, either proven or suspect, from one or more animal reservoirs (Casalone & Di Guardo, 2020). Consequently, substantial efforts and energies should be focused on the study of the ecological interfaces between wild animals/domestic animals/humans, in terms of resources and human capital invested in related research activities. In the current era of the Anthropocene, in which the overbearing, short-sighted and reckless human ecological footprint has produced and continues increasingly to produce all the conditions (climate crisis, global warming, deforestation, desertification, biodiversity loss, demographic growth, human-animal promiscuity, wet markets, etc.) that cause the aforementioned ecological interfaces to narrow progressively, the transfer of infectious agents from wild animals to domestic animals and people becomes increasingly likely.
The only approach capable of effectively combating and preventing all this therefore remains that based on the principle/concept of “One Health,” which constantly reminds us of the intimate and inextricable connection between human, animal and environmental health.
Errare humanum est perseverare autem diabolicum!
References
1. Agrimi U, Di Guardo G, Pocchiari M. Bovine spongiform encephalopathy: An overview. Ann. Ist. Super. Sanita 1992;28:497-505.
2. Almond J, Pattison J. Human BSE. Nature 1997;389:437-438.
3. Casalone C, Di Guardo G. COVID-19 and mad cow disease: So different, yet so similar! Science 2020 (e.Letter).
4. Leuenroth S. Hantavirus Pulmonary Syndrome Infobase Publishing, 2006, ISBN 978-0-7910-8676-6.
5. Martínez VP, Di Paola N, Alonso DO, Pérez-Sautu U, Bellomo CM, Iglesias AA, Coelho RM, López B, Periolo N, Larson PA, Nagle ER, Chitty JA, Pratt CB, Díaz J, Cisterna D, Campos J, Sharma H, Dighero-Kemp B, Biondo E, Lewis L, Anselmo C, Olivera CP, Pontoriero F, Lavarra E, Kuhn JH, Strella T, Edelstein A, Burgos MI, Kaler M, Rubinstein A, Kugelman JR, Sanchez-Lockhart M, Perandones C, Palacios G. “Super-Spreaders” and Person-to-Person Transmission of Andes Virus in Argentina. N. Engl. J. Med. 2020;383:2230-2241.
DOI:10.1056/NEJMoa2009040.
6. Velavan TP, Schmidt-Chanasit J. When Rare Zoonoses Travel: Andes virus, Hantavirus Cardiopulmonary Syndrome, and the Preparedness Gap. Int J Infect Dis. 2026 May 8:108778. doi: 10.1016/j.ijid.2026.108778.
Weissenbacher MC, Cura E, Segura EL, Hortal M, Baek LJ, Chu YK, Lee HW. Serological evidence of human Hantavirus infection in Argentina, Bolivia and Uruguay. Medicina (B Aires). 1996;56(1):17-22.
7. Weissenbacher MC, Cura E, Segura EL, Hortal M, Baek LJ, Chu YK, Lee HW. Serological evidence of human Hantavirus infection in Argentina, Bolivia and Uruguay. Medicina (B Aires). 1996;56(1):17-22.
8. Wells GA, Scott AC, Johnson CT, Gunning RF, Hancock RD, Jeffrey M, Dawson M, Bradley R. A novel progressive spongiform encephalopathy in cattle. Vet Rec. 1987 Oct 31;121(18):419-20. doi: 10.1136/vr.121.18.419. PMID: 3424605.
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