a) Regarding infinity, consciousness clearly grasps entities such as the set {0, 1, 2, 3, ...}. Although the symbolic expressions we use for this set are undeniably finite, anyone with basic mathematical understanding acknowledges that the set contains infinitely many members. Furthermore, we possess genuine knowledge about each element within this infinite set. Yet anything we write or express about it must employ finitely many signs. In short, the infinity we comprehend within consciousness cannot be inscribed or manifested in the same direct way as physical objects; it can only be grasped by another intelligence. This casts doubt on the widespread claim that the human mind is fundamentally incapable of reaching a definitive answer concerning the existence of God. A difficulty afflicting most philosophical positions is that they assert substantive knowledge claims: for instance, idealism maintains that all reality is fundamentally mental in nature, and this too stands in need of philosophical justification.

b) Beyond traditional objections to Sartre’s slogan “others are hell,” I aim to analyze the example of Robinson Crusoe. As a technically capable individual of the eighteenth century, he lived a barbaric, uncultivated existence when isolated from human society. His material possessions were extensive: he commanded an entire island, a resource most people today do not possess at all. The island was surrounded by seas teeming with fish. Even so, his life was scarcely superior to that of a savage. Imagine if you were the last human being on Earth: before long, you would descend into a similar state. For this reason, I firmly reject Sartre’s view.

c) If metaphysical personalists are not solipsists, then at least some entities exist external to myself. Moreover, I cannot directly observe other consciousnesses. When we examine a human brain, we encounter only physical structures, not mental phenomena. It follows that at least some non‑mental entities exist externally to me. For something to count as a genuine constituent of my consciousness, I maintain that being under my control is a necessary condition. After all, if I cannot govern it, how could it belong to the essence of myself? This line of thought parallels Kant’s reflections on the involuntariness of appearances. He then hold that appearances are external objects to which we have direct epistemic access based on this. By the way, I am pleased to find that I am inclined to accept many of the doctrines of personalism.

Prof. Hiršs, thank you for your professional and excellent revelation. It is truly a pleasure to read your thoughtful comments.

I agree with you and the personalists that the only reality directly given to us is consciousness, and that the concept of "matter" is a metaphysical construct.

Though the esteemed Tartu School maintains that the contents of consciousness come from outside the mind, I humbly seek some clarification on this matter.

So I asked an AI about the possibility of testing the existence of matter. It responded that we can never verificationally confirm the existence of mind-independent matter itself, because all verification remains within the circle of experience.

If experience—such as appearance—is merely the mind's self-limitation, then its imperfection and suffering are not imposed from outside, but rather reveal the mind's own irrationality, blindness, or folly. A mind that could limit itself to bliss yet chooses misery is not wise; it is unintelligent.

The AI then suggested that suffering is necessary for the mind to become conscious of itself.

However, if the mind's self-limitation is meant to produce a conscious self, it would only require distinction, order, and boundary—not suffering, randomness, or cruelty. For example, when I wish to fly but cannot, this alone informs me of a limit. Such recognition of boundary does not require pain or suffering. A world that supports agency, clarity, and joy is fully capable of giving rise to a self. To choose imperfection, helplessness, and misery when goodness is possible is not necessity; it is folly.

Thus, I believe this establishes that sensations arise, in some sense, from outside affection upon the mind. Is there something wrong with this reasoning? I agree with your suggestion that the Tartu School may  assume matter is ontologically prior to mind. It seems to me that mind is more fundamental, given that free will enables us to govern matter.

This is an excellent and illuminating idea concerning the function of AI. I would like to draw a comparison between Professor Westerbeek's proposal and a situation in which an individual is controlled by her parents or some other authority: If parents constantly dictate their child's choices throughout her upbringing, her individual autonomy may be severely compromised. However, from the parents' perspective, the child often proves difficult to control—she may choose certain activities or hobbies that her parents disapprove of. Yet parental intervention does not necessarily prevent the child from becoming a responsible person. As some researchers have found, different individuals develop into distinct persons even when raised in identical environments. 

Sorry for the mistake — it should be Hiršs (2024) rather than Andris (2024). That was careless of me.

I wish to view the debate between personalism and physicalism as an inquiry into the fundamental truth of the world: is everything that exists fundamentally physical? Physicalists tend to take for granted that the mind is grounded in the brain, because the mind disappears when the brain is destroyed. This is a strong intuition. However, personalists point out that consciousness cannot be divided. When part of the brain is removed, the remaining subject does not experience their consciousness as having “lost a piece.” It seems that consciousness is an all-or-nothing phenomenon — either present (1) or absent (0). Some physicalists identify themselves as naturalists and regard personalism as opposed to naturalism. However, most ethicists ground personhood-related features such as the moral ought in fundamental non-physical yet natural entities. After all, explaining one thing by another that itself requires explanation leads to an infinite regress. As Andris (2024) notes, personalists and idealists are reluctant or have difficulties to provide positive descriptions of personhood or the personal dimension of reality. Are my understandings correct?