This study examines the political thought of Mohammed Abed Al‑Jabri and his attempt to reconcile Western political ideas with Arab-Islamic political tradition in order to build a modern Arab state.

Al-Jabri argued that Arab political reason has historically been shaped by three main elements: the tribe (al-qabila), the spoils or rent economy (al-ghanima), and belief or dogma (al-‘aqida). According to him, these elements influenced political power from the early Islamic state to modern Arab regimes. He believed that these factors still exist today. Tribal loyalty continues to influence politics, many Arab economies depend on rent rather than productivity, and religion is often used either to support political authority or to oppose it.

Al-Jabri explained that these problems exist because of both external and internal causes. Externally, colonialism weakened Arab societies and their political development. Internally, modernity was adopted in a superficial way, without deep intellectual and institutional reform. Because of this, Arab societies did not fully develop modern political systems based on citizenship, productivity, and pluralism.

To solve this crisis, Al-Jabri proposed a transformation of these three elements. First, tribal loyalty should be replaced by modern civil and political institutions. Second, the rent-based economy should become a productive economy based on taxation and economic participation. Third, religious belief should become a personal opinion rather than an absolute political authority, allowing freedom of thought and diversity.

However, this project appears more like an ideal goal than a real political transformation. Arab countries have not followed this path. Nevertheless, Al-Jabri continued to work on adapting Western political ideas such as democracy, the social contract, and civil society to the Arab-Islamic context.

One important concept he studied was the social contract. In Western political thought, the social contract is the foundation of modern political legitimacy. It explains how political authority comes from the consent of the people rather than from religion or tradition.

Al-Jabri tried to find similar ideas in Islamic history. He pointed to the Constitution of Medina, which organized relations between different groups and established political authority. He saw this as an early form of social contract. However, he noted that Islamic political thought did not develop a clear theory of social contract. Instead, it developed the concept of bay‘a, or allegiance, which emphasized obedience to political authority rather than mutual agreement.

Al-Jabri explained this difference by arguing that Europe had a strong conflict between church and state, which forced thinkers to create the theory of social contract. In contrast, Islam did not have a separate church institution. Religion and politics were closely connected, so there was no need to develop a theory separating them.

However, this explanation is incomplete. The social contract did not develop only because of church-state conflict. It also developed because of philosophical reflection on human nature, political order, and social stability.

For example, the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes developed social contract theory during a time of political chaos and civil war in England. His goal was to create political stability and peace. He argued that people should give authority to a sovereign power in order to avoid conflict and disorder. His theory was not only about religion, but about creating a stable political system based on reason.

In Europe, religious division created instability, but it also encouraged the development of political ideas based on human agreement rather than religious authority. This helped create the modern state.

In contrast, in Islamic political thought, religious and political authority remained connected. Both Sunni and Shiite traditions emphasized obedience to political rulers. This limited the development of alternative political theories based on popular consent.

Another important concept in Al-Jabri’s thought is the historical bloc. He borrowed this idea from the Italian Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci.

For Gramsci, the historical bloc is an alliance between social groups united by shared interests and ideology in order to transform society. This alliance includes both economic forces and intellectual forces. It works to create a new political and social order.

Al-Jabri adapted this concept to the Arab world. He argued that Arab societies need a historical bloc that brings together different groups such as nationalists, Islamists, economic actors, intellectuals, and even some political elites.

This bloc should not be based on strict ideology, but on common goals such as freedom, justice, democracy, and development. Its purpose is to overcome division and create a unified national project.

Al-Jabri believed that this bloc was necessary to achieve Arab renaissance and modernization. He argued that all social forces should participate, including ruling elites, as long as they support reform.

However, this raises an important question: how can groups with very different and sometimes opposing ideologies cooperate?

Gramsci’s historical bloc was formed through struggle against a clear enemy, such as dominant social classes. But Al-Jabri’s bloc includes almost everyone, even ruling elites. This makes it less clear how real change can happen.

Al-Jabri tried to solve this problem by proposing that different groups should temporarily set aside their ideological differences and focus on shared goals. This idea is similar to the concept of the general will developed by the French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau. According to Rousseau, the general will represents the collective interest of society, beyond individual interests.

In Al-Jabri’s vision, the historical bloc expresses this collective interest. It creates unity not through ideology, but through shared national goals.

This idea created hope for political dialogue and cooperation. In Morocco and other Arab countries, there were attempts to bring together nationalist, Islamist, and leftist groups, especially after the Arab Spring in 2011.

However, in reality, these efforts did not succeed. Instead of unity, the Arab world experienced more division, conflict, and instability. Political movements remained divided, and ideological conflict continued.

This shows the limits of Al-Jabri’s project. His ideas are intellectually strong and important, but they are difficult to apply in reality.

In conclusion, Al-Jabri’s work represents an important effort to reconcile Western political thought and Arab-Islamic political tradition. He tried to adapt concepts such as the social contract and the historical bloc to the Arab context.

However, his project remains incomplete. Arab political thought continues to face tension between tradition and modernity. Western political concepts cannot simply be copied, but Islamic political tradition also needs reinterpretation.

Al-Jabri’s work shows both the possibilities and the limits of building a modern Arab political theory based on both Western and Islamic intellectual traditions.