Unlocking the power of dynamic tariffs in the retail electricity market

In this study, we explore the role of dynamic pricing in enhancing electricity market efficiency, improving system reliability, and mitigating price volatility in an era of increasing renewable energy integration.

Published in Earth & Environment

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Dynamic tariff-based demand response in retail electricity market under uncertainty - OR Spectrum

Demand response programs play a crucial role in improving system reliability and mitigating price volatility by altering the core profile of electricity consumption. This paper proposes a game-theoretical model that captures the dynamic interplay between retailers (leaders) and consumers (followers) in a tariff-based electricity market under uncertainty. The proposed procedure offers theoretical and economic insights by analyzing consumer flexibility within a hierarchical decision-making framework. In particular, two main market configurations are examined under uncertainty: i) there exists a retailer that exercises market power over consumers, and ii) the retailer and the consumers participate in a perfect competitive game. The former is formulated as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints, whereas the latter is recast as a mixed-integer linear program. These problems are solved by deriving equivalent tractable reformulations based on the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality conditions of each agent’s problem. Numerical simulations based on real data from the European Energy Exchange (EEX) are used to illustrate the performance of the proposed methodology. The results indicate that the proposed model effectively characterizes the interactions between retailers and flexible consumers in both perfect and imperfect market structures. Under perfect competition, the economic benefits extend not only to consumers but also to overall social welfare. Conversely, in an imperfect market, retailers leverage consumer flexibility to enhance their expected profits, transferring the risk of uncertainty to end-users. Additionally, the degree of consumer flexibility and consumers’ valuation of electricity consumption play significant roles in shaping market outcomes. These findings highlight the crucial impact of market structure and consumer behavior on the dynamics of electricity market pricing under demand response programs.

 Electricity markets face growing uncertainties due to the high integration of renewable energy sources (RES), fluctuating demand, and market power dynamics. Retailers and consumers must navigate these complexities while ensuring economic efficiency, reliability, and sustainability.

Demand response programs have become a great resource for end-users to optimize their flexibility while maximizing their benefits based on incentives or price reductions. They also bring supply security and reduce uncertainty bound to electricity markets.  These methods are prominent in short-term electricity markets involving different market participants. 

Our recent study presents a game-theoretical model that captures the strategic interaction between electricity retailers (leaders) and consumers (followers). 

Approach:
1️⃣  We proposed dynamic tariff-based demand response programs under uncertainty using bilevel programming (Stackelberg game).

2️⃣ Explored two market configurations:
-Market Power: A retailer with market power that maximizes its expected profit and competitive consumers that minimize their cost of electricity consumption.
-Perfect Competition: Competitive equilibrium between retailers and consumers.
3️⃣ Applied stochastic programming to model uncertainty and utility function to quantify consumers' behavior to shift/reduce their electricity consumption.

Using advanced optimization techniques, we formulate these problems as a mathematical program with equilibrium constraints (MPEC) and a mixed-integer linear program (MILP). We derive tractable reformulations using the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions and validate our approach through numerical simulations based on real European Energy Exchange (EEX) data. We Tackle nonconvexity in the MPEC model using an NLP solver in KNITRO and a multistart strategy to identify high-quality solutions without linear approximations.

📊 Some results:

1️⃣Market structure significantly affects consumer flexibility and the demand response program's efficiency.
2️⃣Tariff-based demand response offers substantial cost savings in a competitive market structure and boosts market efficiency if consumers' decision is explicitly modeled.
3️⃣ Empowering and exploiting consumer flexibility is key to sustainable and resilient electricity markets.

Our study contributes to the evolving discourse on electricity market design and demand response strategies. We can move towards a more efficient, sustainable, and resilient electricity market by leveraging dynamic tariffs and consumer flexibility.

For the full publication, visit DOI: 10.1007/s00291-024-00802-x.

We welcome discussions, collaborations, and feedback from the research community, policymakers, and industry stakeholders. Let’s work together to optimize electricity markets for a sustainable future!

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